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Abstract
The paper assesses China's anti-dumping regime, one of the
important structures implemented by China in order to
become a full member of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Section One sets forth the WTO's anti-dumping
principles as well as analyzes the differences between the WTO
principles and the definition of "dumping" as understood by
economists. In significant respects, the WTO principles allow
situations that do not actually constitute dumping-in an
economic sense-to be treated as "dumping," leading to the
imposition of duties and sanctions. Next, the paper evaluates
the degree to which the separate anti-dumping regimes of
China and the U.S. conform to the WTO's anti-dumping
guidelines, both as the legislation is written and as it is applied
in practice. Finally, several case studies of anti-dumping
actions in the agriculture sector are analyzed, identifying the
instrumental use by both countries of anti-dumping law, and
the frequent absence of true economic justification for the
accusations or findings of dumping.
I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the 1970s, China instituted significant economic
reforms. Such reforms shifted China from a government owned and
operated economy to privatization and relaxed protectionist policies.
China continues to open its market and improve its trade relations
with international players.
One of the central issues to market development is anti-
dumping. "Dumping" is defined by the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT") as the trade practice by which "products of one
country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less
than the normal value of the products."' Under the GATT, if a country
is found to have exported products at less than the average compar-
' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), Oct. 30, 1947, Article VI (1), 61
Stat. A- 11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act provides a
more concise definition of dumping: "the sale or likely sale of goods at less than fair
value." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(34) (2014).
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able price, the importing country will have grounds to levy a "counter-
vailing duty" to offset the profits gained via dumping.2 Creating a
marketplace in which countries can fairly trade products and services
is of utmost important, but the anti-dumping measures are now
wielded as a tool to enforce protectionism.3
After fifteen years of observer status to the GATT, China
acceded to the WTO in September 2001, thereby becoming subject to
the terms of the GATT, including the anti-dumping provision.4 China
also acceded to the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, better
known as the Anti-Dumping Agreement ("AD Agreement"), which
clarifies the process for applying anti-dumping measures. Accession
has leveled the playing field, allowing countries that import from
China to bring actions against China for unfair trade and enabling
China to do the same.
While China's accession demonstrates its commitment to redu-
cing unfair trade practices, the question becomes: do the anti-dumping
measures in the GATT and the AD Agreement effectively differentiate
between predatory dumping versus fair, competitive trade? The AD
Agreement does not account for differences between predatory
dumping and "good-natured" competitiveness between countries.
Therefore, adherence to the AD Agreement does not necessarily
demonstrate the degree to which countries are preventing or engaging
in "dumping" according to economists' definition.
This paper first sets forth economists' definition of dumping
and analyzes the similarities and differences between China's domestic
laws and U.S. anti-dumping implementing legislation to the AD
Agreement. The second section will discuss a variety of anti-dumping
2 GATT Article VI (3).
3 Reid M. Bolton, Anti-Dumping and Distrust: Reducing Anti-Dumping Duties under
the W.T.O. through Heightened Scrutiny, 29 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 66 (2011). Available
at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol29/issl/2.
4 China made a number commitments when acceding to the WTO, including the
elimination of "dual pricing practices," price controls and agricultural export subsidies
as well as promulgate domestic legislation implementing the terms of the GATT.
When joining the WTO, China agreed to comply with several other trade-related
treaties including the TRIPS (Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights) Agreement. September 17, 2001, "WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations
on China's Entry," accessible at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres0le/
pr243_e.htm.
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actions initiated by the United States and China to assess whether
predatory dumping actually occurred.
II. ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND ECONOMICS
A. Dumping, as Defined by Economists
Several WTO members had adopted anti-dumping measures
long before the GATT (1947) was drafted, the WTO was created and
GATT Article XI was clarified in the 1994 AD Agreement.5 Therefore,
the countries with experience in drafting and implementing anti-
dumping provisions significantly influenced the negotiation of the
terms of the AD Agreement. 6 Consequently, the terms of the AD
Agreement share many similarities to the terms of the negotiating
countries' domestic legislation, despite their flaws. Arguably the way
the U.S. law is written allows a finding of dumping in a wide range of
circumstances, therefore allowing politics and protectionism to become
a factor in these determinations rather than only being based on
economic determinations of anti-competitiveness and protectionism.7
In fact, these measures may hurt countries' economies calling into
question how and when countervailing duties are being actually being
implemented as a punishment for predatory dumping. In a 1995 study,
the International Trade Commission ("ITC") determined that Ameri-
can anti-dumping and countervailing duties had cost the U.S. economy
$1.59 billion in 1991.8 These findings suggest that anti-dumping laws
Canada adopted its first anti-dumping law in 1904, followed by Australia in 1906 and
the United States in 1921. United States Tariff Commission, "Information Concerning
Dumping and Unfair Foreign Competition in the United States and Canada's Anti-
Dumping Laws," p. 21 (1919).
6 K.D. RAJU, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT ON ANTI-DUMPING, Wolters
Kluwer (2008), p. 22.
The United States adopted the Anti-Dumping Act of 1921 which authorized the
imposition on imports sold below their fair market price. Thomas E. Johnson, The
Retroactive Application of the Antidumping Act of 1921, 1 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 262
(1979). Available at http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article= 105 1&context=njilb. In his article Id at 263.
U.S. International Trade Commission, "The Economic Effects of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension Orders," June 1995. Available at http://
www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub2900.pdf.
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have become a weapon for protectionism rather than a tool for com-
bating anti-competiveness and predatory trade practices.
Young (2001), agreeing with a European Commission report9
on dumping, proposed that true dumping exists only if all of the
following four conditions are present:
(1) The exporting market must be segregated and the
importing market must be open.
(2) The fact that they operate within a segregated domestic
market can give exporters an advantage which is not
due to higher efficiency and which cannot be matched
by competitors in the importing country.
(3) Because of the first two conditions, the dumper is able
to maximize profits or minimize losses.
(4) The dumper's actions can be highly injurious to the
dumper's competitors in the importing country.10
Young points out that the injurious effects of dumping on the compe-
titors in the importing country (i.e., lower profits, reduced work force,
and reduced investment in capital and/or R&D) can just as easily
result from normal competition as it can from predatory dumping. For
true dumping to occur, it is essential that the dumper be able to use the
excess profits from the predatory export to a protected market to cause
material injury to the domestic competitors, including driving them
out of business. Should the exporter simply be more competitive in the
market to which they have exported based on more efficient operations
and lower costs as a result of that efficiency, than these competitive
advantages do not amount to predatory dumping. Competitive advan-
tages are an expected part of a competitive, free market. In fact, compe-
tition within industries stimulates constant review of trade practices to
ensure that businesses operating within that industry retain or achieve
9 The Eleventh Annual Report From the Commission to the European Parliament on
the Community's Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Activities (1992), published
October 26, 2003, gives three reasons why the GATT considers injuries dumping
unfair. These three reasons are the first four conditions presented by Young. EC
Commission (1992). Available at http://aei.pitt.edu/915/.
10 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS 644 (2008).
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a competitive advantage. These competitive advantages are an
expected and desired part of the normal operation of any market-
based economy. In fact, the free-market economy is based on the
principle that certain suppliers will be able to achieve those advantages
and others will be pushed out. Being able to achieve more efficient
operations resulting in lower pricing is not predatory dumping, and
being able to punish such activity corrupts the benefits of anti-
dumping regulations.
Ideally, the WTO AD Agreement should capture a more com-
plex understanding of dumping that is able to recognize the difference
between healthy competition and predatory dumping. Unfortunately,
the AD Agreement does not embody Young's first two conditions:
1) the segregation of the exporter's domestic market; and 2) the
presence of an advantage for the exporter which is not linked to effi-
ciency, and which competitors in the importing country cannot dupli-
cate. Instead the AD Agreement simplistically defines "dumping" as
selling a product below its market price in the exporting country.
Article 2.1 of the Agreement states:
"[f]or the purpose of this Agreement, a product is to be
considered as being dumped, i.e. introduced into the
commerce of another country at less than its normal value,
if the export price of the product exported from one coun-
try to another is less than the comparable price, in the
ordinary course of trade, for the like product when des-
tined for consumption in the exporting country."
It is important to recognize that selling a product below its "normal"
price can be a competitive tactic for sellers expanding into a new
market, even within the same country. Pricing variations do not rise to
the level of predatory damage unless Young's first two conditions are
met. The WTO's definition of dumping allows normal competitive
marketing tactics to be characterized as "dumping."
However, the AD Agreement does address Young's fourth
condition: to find that dumping has occurred, the importing country
246 V_ 21
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must identify an "injury" (defined as a "material injury"11) to the
affected industry within the importing country. In assessing the injury
to the importing country the authorities are instructed to look at the
following factors:
all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing
on the state of the industry, including actual and potential
decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity,
return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors
affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of
dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash
flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to
raise capital or investments. This list is not exhaustive, nor
can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive
guidance.12
Yet, this list is "not exhaustive" nor is any factor designated as being
more demonstrative of dumping than another factor.13 The AD Agree-
ment is adaptable to various factual circumstances, but in being adap-
table gives countries significant leeway in manipulating the analysis to
their favor.
Similarly, with respect to procedure, the Agreement gives a
broad description of important procedural requirements allowing for
countries to provide as much or as little evidentiary support and analy-
sis as they want. For example, Article 12.2 requires that notices of
preliminary or final determinations "shall set forth, or otherwise make
available through a separate report, in sufficient detail the findings and
conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material
by the investigating authorities." 14 "Sufficient detail," like many of the
" Agreement of Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, 1994, GATT B.I.S.D. n. 9, ("Under this Agreement the term 'injury' shall,
unless otherwise specified, be taken to mean material injury to a domestic industry,
threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the
establishment of such an industry and shall be interpreted in accordance with the
provisions of this Article."), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/
19-adp_01_e.htm.
12 AD Agreement, Art. 3.4.
13 Id
14 Id. art. 12.2.1
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other terms used in the AD Agreement is too broad or vague to ensure
that predatory dumping is being targeted rather than mere competi-
tiveness.
B. China's Anti-Dumping Legislation
1. China's Ant-Dumping Regulations
China's domestic anti-dumping legislation tracks closely with
the WTO AD Agreement, therein sharing many of the same flaws as
the AD Agreement.15 The legislation is composed of fifty-nine Articles
and is divided into five Chapters: General Provisions (Chapter I),
Dumping and Injury (Chapter II), Anti-dumping Investigation (Chap-
ter III), Anti-dumping Measures (Chapter IV), Terms and Review of
Anti-dumping duties and price undertakings (Chapter V).16 In many
instances the language is the same as the AD Agreement. For example,
Chapter 2, Article 3 defines "dumping" as when: "a product is impor-
ted to the market of the People's Republic of China at the export price
less than its normal value during the course of normal trade."17 Both
this definition and the AD Agreement's definition center on the
"normal value" of the product. Additionally, the Chinese regulations
and the AD Agreement list three of the same factors to be considered
when assessing whether there is a threat of material injury: a signifi-
cant increase in the quantity of product being imported, whether the
importation has the effect of depressing product costs domestically,
and the extent of the exporting country's inventory.18 Similarly, both
the AD Agreement and the Chinese AD Regulations determine the
"normal value" by looking at the comparable price of the same or
similar product in the importing country.19
Although China's legislation, like the WTO agreement, does
not address the important economic conditions identified by Young, it
5 Olivier Prost & Song Li Wei, Essay: China's Accession to the WTO: How Will This
Benefit European Undertakings?, 24 Fordham Int'l L.J. 554, 567.
16 Anti-dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China, THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF YUNNAN PROVINCE (hereinafter referred to
as "Chinese AD Regulations"). Available at www.yfao.gov.cn/Enshow2.aspx?id=165
(last visited Nov. 26, 2011).
17 Id. at Art. 3.
"s Id. at Art. 3 and AD Agreement at Art. 3.7.
19 Chinese AD Regulations at Art. 4, AD Agreement at Art. 2.1.
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does include some elements that capture the difference between
natural competitiveness versus predatory dumping. An example is a
"public interest" clause, which allows for the broader public interest
within China to prevail over the interest of a small or specific
industry. 20 This is a pro-trade rather than a protectionist measure, as it
focuses on overall market-efficiency rather than the impact on a
specific industry interest. Many of China's trading partners have no
such provision in their respective AD statutes. 21 Another noteworthy
provision allows for imposition of a "lesser duty" than the margin of
dumping, if the lesser penalty would suffice to remedy the injury
caused. Again, many of China's counterparts, including the U.S., have
not adopted this provision. Apparently, China has allowed pro-trade
considerations to prevail over protectionism to a greater extent than
many other nations.22
While the Chinese regulations made small improvements to
the management of dumping, they fail to require the type of analysis
that would draw out the differences between predatory dumping the
free market at work. By not incorporating an analysis of Young's first
two criteria into the definition of dumping, China's AD Regulations
allow industries to file and argue "dumping" claims in cases where the
fundamental economic conditions of true "dumping" may not exist.
2. China's Anti-Dumping Regulations Applied
Countries and analysts have raised concerns about the trans-
parency of China's anti-dumping regulations and the procedural
fairness under the regime.23 Analysts have also alleged inconsistent
application of the rules.24 However, any inconsistencies are well within
the discretion allowed by the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement.
20 Id art. 33. ( "If the Ministry of Commerce deems that the price undertakings made
by export managers are acceptable and conform to the public interests, it may decided
to suspend or terminate the anti-dumping investigation without taking temporary anti-
dumping measures or imposing anti-dumping duties.")
21 Harpaz, supra note 1, at 35.
22Id at3.
23 Jiang Yi Wang, Rule ofLaw and Rule of Officials: Shareholder Litigation and Anti-
Dumping Investigation in China, RULE OF LAW IN CIINA SERIES POLICY BRIEF NO. 4
(2008).
24 Id. at 5.
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An AD investigation can be initiated in several ways. Domestic
industries or natural persons, legal persons or relevant organizations
on behalf of domestic industries can make a written application to the
Ministry of Commerce People's Republic of China ("MOFCOM") to
request investigations.25 "Domestic industry" is defined as:
"all producers of [the People's Republic of China] "PRC"
who produce domestic products of the same kind, or the
producers whose total output makes up a major part of
total output of domestic like products, excluding domestic
producers who have relationships with export or import
managers or who are import managers who dump impor-
ted products." 26
There is one important restriction: No AD investigation shall be initi-
ated if the output of the supporters makes up less than 25% of domes-
tic products.27 But an application from an industry is not the only way
to initiate an action; MOFCOM may initiate AD investigations, sua
sponte, if sufficient evidence of dumping, injury, and a casual
relationship between the two exists.28
C. American Anti-Dumping Legislation
1. America's Anti-Dumping Legislation
Like the WTO Agreement and China's legislation, U.S. anti-
dumping law defines "dumping" as selling "foreign merchandise ... at
less than its fair value." 2 9 While the definition at first glance seems
different given the use of the term "fair" value, a closer look shows
that the analysis depends on the same comparison to the normal value.
An anti-dumping duty can be imposed if:
the Commission determines that (A) an industry in the
United States (i) is materially injured, or (ii) is threatened
25 Anti-dumping Regulations, supra note 8, art. 13.
2 6 Id. art. 11.
27 Id. art. 17.
28 Id. art. 18.
29 Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.S. §1673(1).
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with material injury, or (B) the establishment of an indus-
try in the United States is materially retarded, by reason of
imports of that merchandise, or by reason of sales (or the
likelihood of sales) of that merchandise for importation
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an
antidumping duty ... in an amount equal to the amount by
which the normal value exceeds the export price (or the
constructed export price) for the merchandise.30
Therefore, the U.S. law sets forth the same analysis as the WTO AD
Agreement: identify whether a material injury to a domestic industry
has resulted from the importation and/or pricing of imported foreign
merchandise based on the "normal" value of these products. Further-
more, similarly to the WTO AD Agreement, initiating a formal investi-
gation takes little more than a petition stating that a material injury has
resulted from the important of under-priced foreign merchandise.31 It
is also possible for interested parties to file a petition alleging that the
elements necessary for imposition of the duty imposed by section 731
have been fulfilled.32 Much as in China, the USITC will consider
whether the producers or workers that support the petition account for
at least 25% of the total production of the domestic like product, and
the domestic producers or workers who support the petition account
for more than 50% of the production of the domestic like product
produced by that portion of the industry expressing support for or
opposition to the petition.33 This aligns with the WTO AD agreement.
However, U.S. law more directly allows for politicized
decision-making. U.S. law also includes a provision that enables an
American industry to accuse some exporters of dumping even if the
exporter's selling price in the U.S. is not lower than the selling price in
the exporter's home country. This is possible whenever the US trade
regulator determines that the exporting country is a "non-market eco-
nomy," which is defined as " [a]ny foreign country that the adminis-
tering authority determines does not operate on market principles of
cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in such country
30 19 U.S.C.S §1673.
31 19 U.S.C.S. §1673(a)(c).
32 Id. at § 1673a(b)(1).
33 Id. at § 1673a(c)(4)(A).
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do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise." 34 China's Protocol of
Accession authorizes WTO members to treat China as a "non-market
economy" (NME) for fifteen years from the date of accession.35 Argu-
ably, this provision does more to protect the interests of domestic
industries rather than prevent predatory dumping.
2. America's Anti-Dumping Legislation Applied
China's Protocol of Accession allows WTO members to treat
China different than other countries when investigating claims of
dumping because China is a Non-Market Economy ("NME").
According to Article 15(a)(iii) of the Protocol of Accession;
The importing WTO Member may use a methodology that
is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or
costs in China if the producers under investigation cannot
clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in
the industry producing the like product with regard to
manufacture, production and sale of that product.36
In anticipation of China acceding to the WTO, the United States and
China signed the Agreement on Market Access Between the People's
Republic of China and the United States of America authorizing the
U.S. to use nonmarket criteria in determining whether China is
exporting products below normal costs.3 7 Consequently, if Chinese
producers cannot prove that market economy conditions prevail in
their industry, the Chinese producers are in a sense presumptively
guilty of dumping.38 In determining whether the price of the imported
product reflects the normal value of the same or similar products, the
U.S. can disregard Chinese prices and instead base their analysis on
surrogate countries' pricing. The AD Agreement states:
34 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18) (2012).
35 Protocol of Accession (China), WT/L/432, November 23, 2001. Available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/acc-e/completeacc-e.htm.
36 Protocol of Accession (China), Article 15(a)(iii).
37 Agreement on Market Access Between the People's Republic of China and the
United States of America (hereinafter referred to as "1999 U.S.-China Market Access
Agreement"). Available at https://archive.org/details/AgreementOnMarketAccess.
38 Protocol of Accession (China), Article 15(a)(iii).
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when, because of the particular market situation ... such
sales do not permit a proper comparison, the margin of
dumping shall be determined by comparison with a
comparable price of the like product when exported to an
appropriate third country, provided that this price is
representative, or with the cost of production in the coun-
try of origin plus a reasonable amount for administrative,
selling and general costs and for profits. 39
The AD Agreement and China Protocol of Accession essentially bless
US protectionism, at least until 2016.40
Allowing the U.S. to compare Chinese prices to prices in
countries with workplace protections and other regulations on produc-
tion which typically raise costs distorts the dumping analysis.
Hypothetically, let's set Germany as the surrogate country. Wages, cost
of living and production costs in Germany are much higher; therefore,
the price of the product, which is a reflection of these factors, will be
higher. If the German production cost is used as the basis of the
"normal value," then when compared to the price of the Chinese, there
will be a larger difference between the two prices. This would allow
the U.S. (as the importing country) to impose a greater duty against
China. While Germany would not quality as a surrogate country for
China this hypothetical shows the impact the choice of surrogate
country can have on the determination of a "comparable price" as well
as the anti-dumping duty imposed.
For NMEs the U.S. can look to one or more surrogate countries,
or "market economy countries that are at a level of economic develop-
ment comparable to that of the nonmarket economy country," to
establish the "normal value." 4 1 This means that NMEs are compared to
countries with a comparable per capita GDP.4 2 Once the surrogate
country is selected, the nonmarket economy producers' factors of
39 AD Agreement, Art. 2.2.
40 Jialin Zhang, "U.S.-China Trade Issues After the WTO and the PNTR Deal: A
Chinese Perspective," August 1, 2000. Available at http://www.hoover.org/
ublications/monographs/27197.
19 U.S.C.S. § 1677b(c)(1). Typically the factors of production will be valued in one
surrogate country. 19 CFR §351.408(c)(2).
42 19 C.F.R. §351.408(b).
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production will be evaluated in that surrogate country in order to
establish the "normal value." The factors of production to be con-
sidered include, but are not limited to "(A) hours of labor required,
(B) quantities of raw materials employed, (C) amounts of energy and
other utilities consumed, and (D) representative capital cost, including
depreciation." 43 Because these NMEs are economies in transition,
critics have suggested that the dumping margin is distorted by basing
the normal value determination on market economy factors rather than
economies in transition factors. 44 Others reveal that the use of dev-
eloped countries as surrogates leads to "great miscalculation" and that
the surrogate selection process "allows the [U.S.] to reach whatever
result it chooses." 45
III. ANTI-DUMPING IN PRACTICE
Section One outlined the legal framework for anti-dumping in
China and the U.S. Section Two examines how these laws and
administrative structures are applied in practice.. First, I will examine
the difference in how industries in the U.S. and China use anti-
dumping regulations to correct economic distortions. Next, I will
determine how often, if ever, there is some degree of actual economic
justification for an anti-dumping action launched by either country.
These issues will be addressed using both aggregate statistics and case
studies: three cases initiated by the U.S., and two by China.
43 19 U.S.C.S. § 1677b(c)(3).
44 Robert H. Lantz, The Search for Consistency: Treatment of Nonmarket Economies
in Transition under United States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 10 Am.
U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 993, 1070 (1995).
45 Garrett E. Lynam, Using WTO Countervailing Duty Law to Combat Illegally
Subsidized Chinese Enterprises Operating in a Nonmarket Economy: Deciphering the
Writing on the Wall, 42 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 739, n. 41 (2010). Qianlan Long,
Conflicting Positions But Common Interests: An Analysis of the United States
Antidumping Policy Toward China, 7 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus. 133, 136 (2008).
Sanghan Wan, U.S. Trade Laws Concerning Nonmarket Economies Revisited for
Fairness and Consistency, 10 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 593, 621 (1996).
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A. Statistical Information
China has initiated few anti-dumping actions in comparison to
other countries that have experienced rapid economic growth.46 When
China files a complaint, China does not seem to discriminate between
countries; it applies similar duties on imports from different countries.
Finally, the alleged foreign "dumpers" have won a large number of the
Chinese anti-dumping cases. 4 7
However, China has been the most frequent target of anti-
dumping proceedings, primarily initiated by the European Union,
India and the United States. 48 About 25% of all anti-dumping investi-
gations are directed against China.49 As a WTO member, China con-
tinues to be the target of frequent anti-dumping complaints. Moreover,
data suggests that developed and developing WTO members alike are
discriminating against China relative to other exporting countries, and
that the discrimination has only intensified since China joined the
WTO.50 China is likely to remain a target for anti-dumping actions
given the types of products it exports and the size of its market.
The statistics do not shed light on whether cases are actually
remedying predatory dumping. However, they do suggest that
Chinese industries are not as adept at using their anti-dumping
regulations as a protectionist tool like their U.S. and WTO member
counterparts.
B. Alleged Dumping of Frozen or Canned Warmwater Shrimp and
Prawns by China
The facts from the Certain Frozen and Canned Warmwater Shrimp
From the People's Republic of China case suggest that predatory dumping
4 6 In 2002, China initiated nine AD cases, followed by six in 2003, eight in 2004, seven
in 2005, five in 2006, seven in 2007, six in 2009, and eight in 2009.
47 Harpaz, supra note 1, at 30-31.
48 Minsoo Lee, Donghyun Park, and Aibo Cui, "Invisible Trade Barriers: Trade Effects
of US Antidumping Actions Against the People's Republic of China," October 2013.
Available at http://www.adb.org/publications/invisible-trade-barriers-trade-effects-us-
antidumping-actions-against-prc.
49 Francis Tanczos, Unfair Play: Examining the US. US.Anti-Dumping 'TVar'Against
China, 2 WASHINGTON UNDERGRADUATE L. REv. 77, 78 (2008).
50 Supra n. 55, at 3.
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may have occurred.51 The U.S. Department of Commerce ("DOC")
issued its final determination on December 8, 2004 finding that the
PRC was illegally selling frozen and canned Warmwater shrimp at less
than fair value.52 The DOC found dumping margins ranging from
27.89 to 112.81 percent.53 This means that depending on the product
being imported U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("USCBP") can
collect between a 27.89 and 112.81 percent duty.
The International Trade Commission ("ITC") instituted a
review of this determination in January 2010.54 In its review of whether
subject imports are likely to have no discernible adverse impact on the
domestic industry the ITC finds that the quantity of subject imports
from China has decreased since the imposition of duties.55 While other
factors may have had a hand in this decline, there is no question that
the high duty imposed against Chinese subject imports certainly has
had the greatest impact.
Based on Young's criterion, a finding of dumping was justified
in this case. First, China's domestic markets are closed will the
importing markets are open. While China is moving away from
practices which discriminate against foreign products getting to
market in China the transition is not yet complete.56 However, it is
unclear whether the material injury resulted from China's discrimina-
tory treatment of foreign merchandise or production tactics harmful to
the environment. The Southern Shrimp Alliance, a group of states in
the southern U.S. claimed that the 50% reduction in shrimp production
was the result of Chinese producers' "slash and burn" style aquacul-
s 69 F.R. 70997 (December 4, 2004). An amended final determination and order was
issued on February 1, 2005. 70 F.R. 5,149 (Feb. 1, 2005).
52 Id.
5 70 F.R. 5149, 5151. The dumping margin found for Zhanjiang Guolian Aquatic
Products Co., Ltd. was .07 percent, which is a de minimis finding.
54 75 F.R. 1078 (Jan. 8, 2010).
U.S. International Trade Commission, Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Brazil,
China, India, Thailand, and Vietnam, Publication 4221, p. 13 (Mar. 2011). Available at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/701_731/pub4221.pdf.
56 Helga Josupeit, GLOBEFISH, Presentation at World Shrimp Markets 2004: An
Overview ofthe World Shrimp arket 26 (Madrid, Spain, Oct. 26-27, 2004).
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ture.57 Arguably if the Chinese resist implementing environmental
protections in certain industries with the specific purpose of giving
China the competitive edge, there may be an argument that such
behavior is a way to keep the Chinese market closed. The facts suggest
that predatory dumping may have occurred, but it is difficult Young's
criteria have been met.
C. Alleged Dumping of Non-Frozen Concentrated Apple Juice by
China
On June 7, 1999 Tree Top, Inc., Knouse Foods Cooperative,
Inc., Green Valley Packers, Mason County Fruit Packers, and Coloma
Frozen Foods, Inc. and filed a petition with the DOC alleging that
imports of non-frozen concentrated apple juice ("NFCAJ") from China
were being sold at less than fair value.58 The DOC is authorized to treat
China as a NME; therefore, "normal value" is based on the factors of
production valued in India, the designated surrogate country.59
Initially, dumping margins were sets between 51.69 and 65.64.60
Following the preliminary investigation the dumping margin was set
between 0 and 54.55%.61 The final determination set the dumping
margin at no greater than 51.74.62
China is again not the victor. Where China is the exporting
country alleged to be dumping, India is typically selected to be the
surrogate country to determine the fair value. However, in this case the
respondents argue that Turkey should be the surrogate country.63
According to the respondents "Turkey is the country closest to the
PRC in terms of GNP per capita that is also a significant producer of
57 John Tabari, US Frozen Warm-Water Shrimp: Anti-Dumping Gone to the
Extreme, Cuts Center for International Trade, Economics & Environment, Brief Paper
(2005).
64 F.R. 36330 (July 6, 1999).
59 Id. at 36331.
60 Id. at 36332.
61 64 F.R. 65675, 65680 (Nov. 23, 1999).
62 65 F.R. 19873, 19876 (Apr. 13, 2000).
63 64 F.R. 65675, 65679.
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AJC."64 The Commission concludes that Turkey is not a better surro-
gate because India is a significant producer of apples.65
To meet Young's criteria the exporting market must be closed
and the export must be materially injurious to the importing country's
competitors. Evidence suggests that Chinese companies were selling
their juice within American markets below production costs, but it is
difficult to establish whether the price of the product is low as a
competitive tactic or to discriminate against U.S. product.66 Therefore,
while ensuring that dumping analysis targets predatory dumping
rather than normal competition, it is difficult to differentiate between
competitiveness and predatory behavior.
D. Alleged Dumping of Honey by China
Following the submission of a petition by the American Honey
Producers Association ("AHPA") and preliminary investigations, the
ITC held that the US has been materially injured by the importation of
Chinese honey.67 On October 4, 2001 the ITC issued its final determina-
tion, stating that honey from China was being sold at less than fair
value in the United States and calculated the PRC-entity dumping
margin to be 183.80o.68 In December 2001 the ITC issued an amended
final determination. 69 The duties imposed in 2001 remain in effect
today.
China presented and continues to present a threat to the U.S.
industry. Before the 2001 duties were implemented, the U.S. imported
64 65 F.R. 19873, 19876.
65 Id.
66 van Voorthuizen et al., supra note 32, at 188.
67 Honey From Argentina and China [Investigations Nos. 701-TA-402 and 731-TA-
892-893 (Preliminary)], 65 F.R. 69573 (Nov. 17, 2000).
68 Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; Honey from the
People's Republic of China, 66 F.R. 50608 (Oct. 4, 2001). The preliminary determi-
nation was issued in May 2011. "Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less
Than Fair Value: Honey From the People's Republic of China," 66 F.R. 24101, 24108
(May 11, 2001). Because the ITC found that the importer had been materially injured,
knowledge of the dumping can be imputed to all producers/exporters in China. 66 F.R.
24101 at 24107.
69 "Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and
Antidumping Duty Order; Honey From the People's Republic of China", 66 F.R.
63670, Dec. 10, 2001).
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58.7 million pounds of honey from China.70 As of 2010, the U.S. only
imports 1.75 million pounds from China.71 While the average price of
honey being sold in the U.S. in 2010 was calculated at $1.45 per pound,
transshipped Chinese honey was sold at 75 centers per pound.72
Therefore, while the duties have significantly reduced the number of
Chinese honey imports into the U.S., the Chinese have still found ways
to get their products into the U.S. market by selling the honey through
a "middle" country. Executive Secretary of the AHPA Jerry Brown
said, "Chinese producers have also become more sophisticated in the
ways in the ways they attempt to skirt U.S. duties on their products ...
honey is being made in China is often times relabeled and trans-
shipped through other countries that aren't subject to the stiff tariffs."73
In addition to being able to avoid paying the anti-dumping tariffs, the
Chinese have also been found to be selling honey with high fructose
corn syrup, antibiotics and heavy metals.74 Consequently the European
Union banned imports of Chinese honey.75 In 2013 the ITC imple-
mented a $2.63/kilogram duty on Chinese honey exports. 76 The anti-
dumping duty, by treating natural honey, flavored honey and artificial
honey the same, has significantly impacts China's honey exports. 7
This case is harder to analyze under Young's criteria than the
proceeding cases. The reason for the difficulty is that the U.S. is the
largest producer and second largest consumer of honey.78 This has led
to significant distortions in the facts surrounding the honey industry in
the U.S., which in turn makes it difficult to determine the actual impact
70 Statement of American Honey Producers Association (hereinafter referred to as
"AHPA Statement"), Hearing on "Enforcing America's Trade Laws in the Face of
Customs Fraud and Duty Evasion," May 5, 2011 at p. 3. Available at http://www.
finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/0505 1 1ratest.pdf.
71 id.
72 Id at p. 4.
73 Jonathan Randles, "ITC Keeps Duties on Honey from China," November 19, 2012.
Available at http://www.1aw360.com/articles/395296/itc-keeps-duties-on-honey-from-
china.
74 AHPA Statement at p. 3.
75 d
76 78 F.R. 56860 (Sept. 16, 2013). Jonathan Randles, "Commerce Sets Dumping Rate
on Chinese Honey Imports" (June 27, 2013). Available at http://www.1aw360.com/
articles/453772/commerce-sets-dumping-rate-on-chinese-honey-imports.
77 id.
7 8Id.
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on the industry. It is clear, however, that proof of injury was lacking.
The U.S. industry did not appear to have experienced any material
injury at the time of the ruling, and so the anti-dumping action was
actually a precaution against harm that probably had not yet occurred.
Furthermore, there was no definitive evidence that such an injury
would have occurred absent the anti-dumping measures. Thus, the
action against Chinese honey probably would not qualify as anti-
dumping in economic terms, because the fourth criterion does not
appear to exist.
E. Alleged Dumping of Distiller's Dried Grains With or Without
Solubes by the U.S.
On Dec. 28, 2010, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce
("MOFCOM") initiated an anti-dumping investigation into the import
of distiller's dried grains with or without solubes (DDG) from the U.S.
Four Chinese DDG producers initiated the case, representing a total of
50% of China's domestic industry. The Chinese DDG industry claimed
they lost significant sales due to a surge in sales of U.S. origin DDG at
lower than market prices. 79
The measure was highly criticized in the U.S. and the response
was strong. The U.S. Grains Council immediately gathered seventy
U.S. companies to register as interested parties in the proceedings. The
U.S. argued that demand for DDG from China had increased greatly in
a relatively short time, and that the substantial increase of purchases
had led to a reduction of the price under an economies of scale
argument. The case is still pending but has already created trade
tensions between the Chinese and U.S. grain industries.so
It is unlikely that this situation qualifies as dumping in the
economic sense. There is little or no evidence that the alleged dumper
enjoys a cost advantage which competitors in the importing country
cannot match, and which derives from a protected domestic market.
The U.S. industry representatives argued that they could sell these
79 U.S. Grains Council, "Why Buy U.S. Grains?" (Jan. 7, 2011). Available at http://
www.grains.org/index.php/buying-selling?id=2829:usgc-facilitates-industry-wide-
response-to-chinas-anti-dumping-case&catid=72.
* See Elise Schafer, Trade Tension: China Launches Anti-Dumping Case Against
US., Feed & Grain (Apr. 18, 2011), www.feedandgrain.com/article/10241874/trade-
tension-china-launches-anti-dumping-case -against-united- states.
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dried grains to China at lower prices because of the quantity of grain
per order. This is possible due to the economies of scale argument,
which sets forth that the per-unit cost of processing the grains may
decrease significantly as the quantity increases. This case has not yet
been adjudicated so it remains to be seen what the legal resolution will
be.
F. Alleged Dumping of Imported Potato Starch by the E.U.
The Chinese first imposed anti-dumping duties against Euro-
pean Union potato starch imports in February 2007.81 The instituted
12.6% duties against the Dutch starch manufacturer and a 56.7%
French starch byproducts manufacturer. 82 In September 2001 China
imposed additional duties of 7.5 %-12.4% on potato starch, when
MOFCOM found that EU subsidized potato starch products negatively
affected domestic producers claiming to have been harmed by the
subsidies the E.U. provides to its producers.83 China has been more
aggressive about initiating anti-dumping actions against the European
Union in response to the European Union's and United States'
increasing number of actions against China.84 It is likely that this has
driven China to initiate counter-measures, such as the duties on E.U.
potato starch.85
Little information is available regarding the investigation of
China's anti-dumping claims, making it difficult to assess whether this
determination targeted predatory dumping rather than normal compe-
tition. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce has stated that the investiga-
tion has resulted in the determination that E.U.-produced imports of
potato starch have injured the Chinese domestic potato starch
s' Aaron Taube, "China Keeps Anti-Dumping Duties On EU Potato Starch," Feb. 6,
2013. Available at http://www.law360.com/articles/413229/china-keeps-anti-dumping-
duties-on-eu-potato- starch.
82 id.
83 USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, "Gain Report: People's Republic of China,
Potatoes and Potato Products Annual" (Dec. 20, 2012). Available at http://goo.gl/
YhYxAr.
84 Supra fn 99.
85 Id; see also Prepared Foods' Daily News, Potato Starch Dragged into China, EU
Battle (May 17, 2011), www.preparedfoods.com/articles/potato-starch-dragged-into-
china-eu-battle.
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producers. 86 The WTO's investigation and results are the only
available information. Apparently, the WTO's definition of dumping
has been satisfied. The WTO found that dumping has occurred, and
has clearly stated that Chinese domestic producers have been injured.
In order to determine whether dumping has occurred under the econo-
mic definition, however, it would be necessary to determine whether
the other three criteria have been met, particularly the first two. With
the limited facts provided in the WTO investigation, a conclusion
cannot be drawn regarding these criteria.
IV. CONCLUSION
The analysis leads to a number of interesting conclusions. With
regard to cases lodged against China, three points are important. First,
the well-structured and organized U.S. agriculture organizations repre-
senting domestic producers are in a strong (and politically popular)
position to lobby with the U.S. government, which causes anti-
dumping actions to be brought against China.87 Second, the lack of
organization among Chinese producers as well as asymmetric infor-
mation (i.e. lack of familiarity with U.S. and foreign law) contributed to
the lack of proper response by China in some of these AD cases,
especially in early years. Third, the treatment of China as an NME
often leads to adverse rulings; complainants can use tactics such as the
choice of a surrogate country, or the definition of a product to place
China at a disadvantage.
A stronger organization among Chinese producers and a
willingness to fight back would contribute to a lower level of abuse of
process by U.S. producers, who may be supported to some extent by
the U.S. government, and may leave room for genuine AD cases.
Furthermore, China's continued effort to be recognized as a market
86 Supra fn. 100.
7 U.S. Trade Rep., Report to Congress on China's UTO Compliance at 34 (2010),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm-send/2596. Such actions appear to have been
welcomed by the U.S. Government. In its 2010 Report to Congress on China's WTO
Compliance, the USTR reported that: 'Throughout 2010, the U.S. continued to work
closely with U.S. companies affected by Chinese AD investigations in an effort to help
them better understand the Chinese system. The U.S. also advocated on their behalf in
connection with ongoing AD investigations, with the goal of obtaining fair and
objective treatment for them, consistent with the AD Agreement'.
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economy may reduce the severity or frequency of rulings against
Chinese producers. With regard to cases lodged by China, it is
interesting to note the fierce responses from the E.U. and U.S. as a
result of these procedures. Both trading partners strongly oppose the
procedures and often accuse China of protectionism.
As a result of the discretion left by the WTO Anti-dumping
Agreement to its members, many countries, including both China and
the U.S., make instrumental use of the Agreement and only selectively
target AD investigations. The U.S. has often been alleged of protecting
its own market by aggressively imposing AD duties.88 China's legal
system has been criticized for its lack of transparency and procedural
fairness. Though this does not necessarily imply that China is
attempting to protect its own industries, it does give China consider-
able leeway to interpret and apply its laws as it sees fit. The trade
relationship between China and the United States could be streng-
thened if the U.S. removed its protectionist measures and China
improved the transparency of their legal system.
" See, e.g., Brink Lindsey, The US.Antidumping Law Rhetoric versus Reality,
Center for Trade Policy Studies, Trade Policy Analysis No. 7 (Aug. 16, 1999).
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